Declassified Records Trace the Many Hidden Interactions Between the U.S. Civilian and National Security Space Programs
Secret Cooperation Punctuated by Disputes over Budgets, Encryption of Scientific Data, and Fallout from the Challenger Tragedy
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 509
Edited by James E. David
Posted April 10, 2015
For more information contact:
James E. David, [email protected] or
The National Security Archive 202/944-7000, [email protected]
[Voice Over of article at the end]
Source – The National Security Archive
by James E. David, April 10th 2016
Washington, DC, April 10, 2015 – Furnishing cover stories for covert operations, monitoring Soviet missile tests, and supplying weather data to the U.S. military have been part of the secret side of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) since its inception in 1958, according to declassified documents posted for the first time today by the National Security Archive at The George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).
James E. David, a curator in NASA’s Division of Space History, obtained the documents in the course of researching his critically praised book, Spies and Shuttles: NASA’s Secret Relationships with the DoD and CIA (University Press of Florida, 2015). David has compiled, edited and introduced more than 50 of these records for today’s posting.
Even though Congress’s intention in forming NASA was to establish a purely civilian space agency, according to David a combination of circumstances led the agency to commingle its activities with black programs operated by the U.S. military and Intelligence Community. This often tight cooperation did not, however, keep disputes from bubbling over on issues such as cost sharing, access to classified information, encryption of data originally intended for civilian use, and delays to military satellite launches caused by the Challenger disaster.
Over the years, classification restrictions have kept most of the story of NASA’s secret activities out of the public eye. Today’s posting brings to light previously unpublished primary source material that underpins Spies and Shuttles and other important literature on the subject. The records were acquired through agency declassification review procedures, specific declassification requests, and archival research.
* * * * *
NASA’s Secret Relationships
By James E. David
The legislation establishing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958 attempted to create separate and distinct civilian and military aeronautical and space programs. It directed NASA to conduct peaceful, scientific, and open aeronautical and space research and operations and the Department of Defense (DoD) to perform these activities related to military operations and defense.[1]
This mandate was a guiding principle for NASA and the nation’s political leaders concerning its spaceflight programs. These programs were promoted as demonstrations of America’s use of space for peaceful and scientific purposes.[2] However, NASA could not and did not always follow the mandate for several reasons. These included the need for NASA and the national security agencies to utilize each other’s hardware and facilities to accomplish their missions, the reliance on one another for data and expertise concerning foreign aeronautical and space programs, and the requirement to monitor and restrict certain NASA programs to eliminate threats to classified programs or deny important scientific data to the nation’s adversaries.
Because of classification, very little of the story of NASA’s hidden relationships with the DoD and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the spaceflight area has been made public until now. The documents presented here were obtained in the research and writing of Spies and Shuttles: NASA’s Secret Relationships with the DoD and CIA. Most were declassified by agencies under the automatic/systematic declassification review program or acquired through declassification requests. They are grouped into the following categories:
- NASA as a consumer of intelligence
- NASA’s assistance to analyzing intelligence on foreign aeronautical and space programs
- NASA’s participation in cover stories
- NASA’s acquisition and use of classified technologies in its lunar exploration program
- Restrictions on NASA’s remote sensing programs
- NASA’s application satellites and national security requirements
- Space Shuttle
NASA as a Consumer of Intelligence
NASA’s Skylab space station, crewed for three periods during 1973-1974. (Photo credit: NASA)
As has been discussed in earlier Archive postings and several works, Soviet civilian and military space activities were a critical intelligence target during the Cold War.[3] NASA and the nation’s political and military leaders required timely and accurate information on the Soviet efforts. Because of the secrecy surrounding them, the intelligence agencies were the only source of this data.
Even before NASA formally began operations in October 1958, the CIA offered its leadership Office of Scientific Intelligence reports and briefings on the Soviet space program (Document 1). Access to this information was quickly given to selected working-level officials (Document 2). National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) published by the U.S. Intelligence Board were the highest-level reports on the Soviet space program and other issues. A prior Archive posting has all seven NIEs published from 1962 to 1983 that focused solely on the Soviet space program. NASA received the first of many NIEs and SNIEs on this and related topics shortly after beginning operations (Document 3).
The CIA established the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC) in 1963 as the primary office to analyze all foreign space and missile programs. It produced a wide range of publications (including some on a daily or weekly basis) and conducted briefings of CIA, NASA, and other officials. By 1966, NASA’s leadership was receiving both FMSAC’s publications and regular briefings by its personnel on the Soviet space program (Document 4).
NASA continued to receive intelligence reports and briefings into the 1980s (Document 5). Although there are no records on point, it undoubtedly has received them since.
NASA’s Assistance to Analyzing Intelligence on Foreign Aeronautical and Space Programs
James Fletcher, NASA Administrator from 1971-1977 and 1986-1989. (Photo credit: NASA)
As set forth in Document 2, the CIA recognized the valuable contributions NASA could make to analyzing intelligence. NASA’s assistance was initially on an ad hoc basis, such as commenting on draft NIEs (Document 6). To provide it on a more permanent basis, the CIA and NASA agreed in 1964 that two engineers from the Office of Manned Space Flight would be detailed full-time to FMSAC (Document 7). This arrangement continued at least into the late 1960s, but other than generally helping to analyze the Soviet human spaceflight program their exact contributions are unknown.
To obtain NASA’s expertise in a wider range of aerospace fields, the CIA and NASA agreed in 1965 to establish eight joint CIA-NASA advisory panels that would meet once or twice a year (Document 8). One of the few declassified records is the agenda and summary minutes of the first meeting of the Lunar and Planetary Panel (Document 9). It is not known how long the panels remained active.
In the early 1970s, NASA obtained membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board’s Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee. Formed in 1956, the committee’s duties included reporting on significant foreign missile and space intelligence to the Board, developing missile and space intelligence objectives, and evaluating the ability of collection systems to meet them. NASA continued to be a member of the successor Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (Document 10). Virtually all the post-1970 reports and other products of these two committees remain classified.
The CIA created the Space Intelligence Panel in 1965 to advise the director of central intelligence (DCI) (Document 11). Among other things, its mandate was to review intelligence community assessments on foreign programs and recommend improvements in analytical techniques and collection capabilities. All the initial members came from outside the CIA and included two NASA officials. By the time their four-year terms expired these two individuals had left NASA and were working in industry. Whether any other NASA employees ever sat on the Panel is unknown. The agenda to a November 1968 meeting is one of the few declassified records of the Panel (Document 12).
Beginning in 1963, the CIA requested assistance from NASA’s Langley Research Center in analyzing the aerodynamic properties of Soviet aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft. A small group of engineers frequently used classified photography to make models of the vehicles and then tested them in the Langley wind tunnels under secure conditions. They prepared reports and gave briefings, including one to the DCI in 1968 (Document 13). Before the project ended in the 1980s, the NASA engineers gave numerous briefings to other intelligence agencies, the armed services, and contractors.
NASA’s Participation in Cover Stories
Hugh Dryden, who served as director of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics from 1947-1958, played a critical role in developing and maintaining the cover story for the U-2 as a weather reconnaissance aircraft starting in the mid-1950s (Document 14). Dryden and selected other NASA officials continued participating in the cover story after NASA assumed the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics in 1958. This caused it great embarrassment after the shoot-down of Gary Powers’ aircraft in May 1960, but NASA continued providing confidential advice on cover stories for other projects in the following years.
Dryden advised the CIA on the cover story for the A-12, the CIA’s successor to the U-2 (Document 15). To improve the procedure to develop and disseminate cover stories for overhead reconnaissance vehicles, the intelligence agencies established the Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee in 1963. Robert Seamans, then NASA’s associate administrator, was a consultant (Document 16). Although the Committee was still in existence early the following decade, there is no information available on what it did or how long NASA participated in its work.
NASA’s Acquisition and Use of Classified Technologies in its Lunar Exploration Program
James E Webb, NASA Administrator from 1961-1968. (Photo credit: NASA)
To acquire the high-quality imagery needed to select Apollo landing sites on the Moon, NASA officials contacted the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) beginning in 1961 about using classified cameras in lunar probes. NASA eventually selected Kodak’s SAMOS E-1 film readout system as the best candidate. The E-1 had flown several times before all SAMOS film readout systems were cancelled in late 1961 (Document 17).
NASA and the DoD signed the “DOD/CIA-NASA Agreement on NASA Reconnaissance Programs” in August 1963 establishing the procedures under which NASA could acquire and use classified cameras for lunar photography (Document 18). Shortly thereafter, NASA and the NRO signed a Security Annex establishing the classification levels of about 40 types of information relating to the agreement (Document 19).
Not surprisingly, NASA selected Boeing’s bid which incorporated the E-1 camera for the new Lunar Orbiter program. The 1963 agreement was modified the following year because of fears that NASA could not maintain security under it (Document 20).
In case the Lunar Orbiters did not produce the necessary photography to select landing sites for Apollo, NASA planned to use another classified camera in manned lunar orbital missions to acquire it. NASA and the NRO signed the unclassified “DoD-NASA Agreement on the NASA Manned Lunar Mapping and Survey Program” in April 1964 establishing the project (Document 21). It had codeword annexes, which remain classified today. Under the project, which carried the classified codename of UPWARD, the GAMBIT 1 high-resolution camera was selected. After the five Lunar Orbiters flown in 1966 and 1967 met NASA’s requirements for selection of Apollo landing sites, NASA briefly considered using the cameras in Earth-orbital missions for remote sensing before cancelling the project in 1967 (Document 22).[4]
NASA also used classified cameras in the manned Apollo missions to image the Moon. Apollo 13 and 14 service modules carried the Hycon lunar topographic camera, which was a modified Air Force KA-7A camera flown on an unknown reconnaissance aircraft. Apollo 15, 16, and17 service modules flew the more capable Itek panoramic camera and a Fairchild mapping and stellar camera. The former was a modified IRIS II optical bar camera used in U-2s (Document 23), and the latter was a modified Dual Image Stellar Index Camera carried by CORONA satellites from 1967-1972. It is not known whether these instruments were acquired under either of the above agreements.
Restrictions on NASA’s Remote Sensing Programs
NASA’s Landsat 2 remote sensing satellite, launched in 1975. (Photo credit: NASA)
NASA’s remote sensing programs held the promise of collecting scientific data important to many disciplines and promoting international cooperation. At the same time, however, the national security agencies had two major concerns about them. The first was that such actions as releasing imagery of sensitive foreign sites might result in a renewed Soviet effort to limit observing from space. Second, they were worried about the overt use of classified technologies or their equivalent that would reveal U.S. reconnaissance capabilities, assist other nations in improving theirs, or help them in developing countermeasures. As a result, except for weather satellites that produced very low-resolution photographs all of NASA’s space-based Earth-imaging activities were closely monitored and subject to numerous restrictions.
The NRO and NASA reached an agreement in August 1965 limiting the capabilities of NASA’s space-based image-forming sensors used to photograph the Earth to the equivalent of 20 meters from low-Earth orbit. It also required the NRO to review all of NASA reconnaissance-related activities as broadly defined in the agreement (Document 24).
Astronaut photography of sensitive sites in the Gemini program led the DCI in December 1965 to establish a review process by the intelligence agencies of all astronaut photography before public release (Document 25). This remained in place through Apollo-Soyuz in 1975. There is very little information available on what images were withheld through the years. Additionally, beginning with Apollo 6 in 1968 NASA was required to submit its proposed photographic experiments to the intelligence agencies before each mission. This also continued through Apollo-Soyuz in 1975. The intelligence agencies occasionally imposed restrictions on the proposed experiments, as in the case of the Earth Terrain Camera carried on Skylab (Document 26).
At the direction of the secretary of state, the interagency National Security Action Memorandum 156 Committee examined NASA’s plans to carry image-forming sensors in the Apollo Applications Program which exceeded the 20-meter limit (Document 27). Its July 1966 report reaffirmed the technical limits in the August 1965 NASA-NRO agreement but also endorsed a carefully managed space-based remote sensing program because of the many potential scientific and political benefits.
In September 1966, NASA and the DoD signed the “DOD-NASA Coordination of the Earth Resources Survey Program” to monitor NASA’s programs (Document 28). The two committees mandated under the agreement to do this were very active in the roughly four years they met, particularly the joint NASA-NRO Survey Applications Coordinating Committee (Document 29).
The Apollo Applications Program lost White House and congressional support during the late 1960s and NASA turned to the development of the robotic Landsat satellites to conduct systematic remote sensing, the first of which was launched in July 1972. Both this and the subsequent ones carried multispectral cameras that were well within the 20-meter limit of the August 1965 agreement and the new 10-meter limit established in Presidential Directive/NSC-37 of May 1978 (Document 30).
NASA planned to fly a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) — the first to be openly flown in space — on the SEASAT-A satellite scheduled for launch in 1978. (The NRO had tested a SAR during late 1964 in Project QUILL. It reportedly launched its first operational SAR satellite in 1988.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the SAR did not involve sensitive technologies but that it could conduct surveillance of U.S. military forces. Although NASA successfully opposed demands that the uplinks and downlinks be encrypted to prevent unauthorized use, in the end it agreed to incorporate an enabling/disabling device to achieve this, to give the DoD 24-hour advance notice of imaging plans, and to accept restrictions on the acquisition of imagery over the United States (Document 31).
By the early 1970s, the two committees mandated under the September 1966 DoD-NASA agreement to monitor NASA’s remote sensing programs were no longer meeting — for unknown reasons. Accordingly, the DoD, CIA, and NASA signed an agreement in August 1975 establishing the Program Review Board and two committees under it to perform these functions (Document 32). Although few of their records are declassified, it appears that they reviewed all the proposed remote sensing and other civilian experiments for the early Shuttle missions (Document 33).
The pre- and post-mission review processes by the intelligence agencies were not routinely used during the Shuttle program. Nevertheless, in response to concerns about the open dissemination of imagery from late 1983 flights the White House directed that NASA work with the national security agencies in reviewing imagery from later missions (Document 34).
NASA’s Applications Satellites and National Security Requirements
NASA’s SEASAT-A oceanographic satellite, launched in 1978. (Photo credit: NASA)
NASA’s weather, geodetic, and remote sensing satellites acquired a wide range of data that met civilian requirements and, on occasion, national security requirements. Discussed below are the contributions its geodetic and remote sensing satellites made to satisfying the latter.
Civilian scientists needed geodetic data to determine the size and shape of the Earth and for other purposes, while the DoD required it primarily for the targeting of long-range missiles. Because satellite geodesy resulted in much more accurate measurements than traditional ground, sea, and air surveys, the DoD and NASA established the joint ANNA geodetic satellite program in 1960 to help meet their needs. However, NASA refused to participate until the DoD agreed that most of the data would be unclassified (Document 35).
The DoD and NASA established the follow-on National Geodetic Satellite Program (NGSP) in 1964 (Document 36). Both DoD and NASA acquired data from the five satellites launched from 1964-1968, but the DoD also obtained it from measuring devices on its own satellites such as CORONA and SECOR. For the most part, the DoD refused to share with NASA the raw data from its own satellites and processed data more accurate than could be derived solely from the NGSP. The resulting conflict between DoD and NASA over these practices was brought to the attention of President Johnson in 1968, but there is no indication that it was resolved (Document 37).
NASA planned on launching the Geodynamics Experimental Ocean Satellite-3 (GEOS-3) with a radar altimeter whose data would generate more accurate gravity models than any measuring devices previously flown. The data would be used to meet civilian requirements and by the U.S. Navy to improve the accuracy of its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Because it also had the potential to be used by the Soviets for the same purpose, the DoD requested NASA to encrypt the data, limit the acquisition of data over the ocean areas where Soviet ballistic missile submarines operated, or delay the planned April 1975 launch until the issue could be resolved. It also requested encryption of the data from the even more capable radar altimeter planned for SEASAT-A. NASA rejected these requests but quickly agreed to restrict the dissemination of the GEOS-3 data collected over the regions where Soviet ballistic missile submarines operated (Document 38).
NASA and the DoD continued to fight over encrypting the SEASAT-A radar altimeter data. In 1976, NASA proposed changing the orbital inclination to avoid encryption, but the DoD rejected this on the basis that the original orbit would result in the best data for improving SLBM accuracy (Document 39). Once the new DoD civilian leadership took the position that the Soviets would not benefit from either the GEOS-3 or SEASAT-A radar altimeter data, President Carter ordered in May 1977 that all of it be openly disseminated (Document 40).
The multispectral data acquired by the Landsat remote sensing satellites was initially assessed to have little intelligence value (Document 41). However, with the growing importance on improving intelligence estimates of the Soviet wheat crop the CIA soon began routinely using the imagery for this purpose (Document 42).
NASA, the National Security Agencies, and the Shuttle
The launch of the first Shuttle flight, STS-1, in 1981. (Photo credit: NASA)
NASA’s longest and deepest cooperation with the defense and intelligence agencies was in the Shuttle program. For the only time in its history, it used their requirements to determine the size and capacity of a spacecraft, flew classified missions, gave priority to them, utilized a secure command and control system, and withheld mission information from the public.
There are several works that give very good overviews of the NASA-DoD interaction.[5] With little support for its proposed space station or Mars mission, NASA soon focused on a reusable Shuttle as the major post-Apollo program and worked closely with the DoD to ensure it met all of its requirements. These mandated a larger Shuttle, cargo bay, payload capacity, and cross-range than NASA needed, but it endorsed them to ensure DoD’s support for the project. Nixon approved development of the full-sized Shuttle that met DoD’s specifications in January 1972, with the first operational mission scheduled for 1978.
The DoD quickly studied possible employment of the Shuttle in a variety of missions (Document 43). It initially planned to fly about 20 Shuttle missions annually from 1978-1990 and would transition all of its payloads from expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) to the Shuttle once it proved reliable and economical.
Although NASA paid the vast majority of the program’s costs, the DoD had substantial outlays for such items as building the Vandenberg Air Force Base launch complex and the Inertial Upper Stage to place payloads into higher orbits. When the Office of Management and Budget proposed in 1977 to scale back the program because of cost overruns and technical problems, the DoD initially argued that both the Vandenberg and Kennedy Space Center launch complexes and five orbiters must be built (Document 44). However, after the DoD decided that a complete fifth orbiter was not crucial President Carter directed that both complexes and four orbiters be built, with an option to acquire a fifth orbiter in the future (Document 45). As it always had, the DoD refused to pay any costs of the orbiters.
The DoD planned to transition all payloads to the Shuttle at both complexes and to end a backup launch capability on ELVs by 1985. It also planned to begin flying on the Shuttle that year new satellites that because of their configuration or weight could not be launched on existing ELVs (Document 46).
The Carter administration again addressed the continuing cost overruns and technical problems in 1980, which had forced the delay of the first orbital flight. The DoD’s civilian leadership continued to strongly support the program and agreed to provide the needed extra funds out of the Air Force budget (Document 47).
Columbia flew the first orbital mission in 1981. However, it was soon evident that the program could not meet the revised schedule of 34 flights through 1985 because of technical problems and that none of the orbiters could meet the performance requirements of launching 65,000 pounds (with an upper stage) into low-Earth, low-inclination orbits from Kennedy or 32,000 pounds into low-Earth, high-inclination orbits from Vandenberg. Problems with Shuttle availability caused the DoD to delay transition of some satellites to it and the performance shortfalls led NASA to study thrust augmentation measures to eliminate them (Document 48).
The defense and intelligence agencies became increasingly worried about the shortfalls, particularly with respect to the Shuttle’s inability to launch any reconnaissance satellites from Vandenberg. After a long battle with NASA, the DoD got President Reagan’s approval in 1985 to acquire ten new ELVs (ultimately designated Titan IVs) that could launch payloads the same size and weight the Shuttle was designed to handle (Document 49).
Before the Challenger accident in January 1986, the Shuttle carried several DoD unclassified and classified experiments and launched satellites in two dedicated, classified missions. Because both NASA and the DoD had so few ELVs at the time and the Shuttle did not fly again for almost three years, the accident caused great delays in launching their payloads. NASA also cancelled virtually all the performance-enhancing measures for safety reasons, and thus the Shuttle was still incapable of carrying any reconnaissance satellites from Vandenberg and selected payloads from Kennedy (Document 50). President Reagan directed in 1986 that the DoD acquire more Titan IVs and new medium-lift ELVs (Document 51). After the eight dedicated, classified Shuttle missions from 1988-1992, the DoD no longer used it to place satellites in orbit and began launching all of them on ELVs once again.
THE DOCUMENTS
Document 1: CIA, C.P. Cabell, General, USAF, Acting Director, Letter to Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 10 September 1958. Confidential.
Source: CIA Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Request
The CIA’s acting director offers to share intelligence on Soviet space programs with NASA’s administrator in this memo written before NASA started formal operations on 1 October 1958. During this period, the Office of Scientific Intelligence had the primary responsibility within the CIA to produce this information.
Document 2: CIA, [Redacted], Memorandum to Chief, Collection Staff, SI, “Meeting with NASA Personnel,” 16 January 1959. Secret.
Source: CIA MDR Request
Both the CIA and NASA recognized the need to expand access to intelligence beyond NASA’s leadership. This internal CIA memo describes a meeting with working-level NASA personnel in January 1959 to discuss the procedures under which NASA would obtain intelligence and, in turn, provide the CIA with relevant publications.
Document 3: CIA, [Redacted], Executive Secretary, Letter to Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, 9 December 1958. Classification Unknown.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives, College Park, Maryland
This transmittal memo forwarded ten U.S. Intelligence Board National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates on the Soviet guided missile and space programs and related topics, the first ones NASA received. Typically published annually or biennially, NASA continued to receive many of these high-level reports in the following years.
Document 4: CIA, Albert Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, “Intelligence Information Support to NASA,” 13 February 1966. Secret/TALENT-KEYHOLE.
Source: CREST
In response to a query by the DCI, the deputy director for science and technology informs him that the CIA regularly provides numerous publications and briefings on the Soviet space program to NASA’s leadership. Most of the publications were now prepared by FMSAC, which had been created in 1963 to assume most of the responsibilities for the production of foreign missile and space intelligence. Virtually all of the publications provided NASA remain classified today.
Document 5: CIA, [Redacted], Chief, Space Systems Division, Letter to Dr. Milton Silveira, Office of the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 26 July 1982. Secret.
Source: CREST
This memo states that the CIA will provide the monthly briefings on Soviet aerospace activities that NASA Administrator James Beggs had requested for himself and other senior NASA officials. The list of exact topics is completely redacted.
Document 6: CIA, John A. McCone, Director, Letter to Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 10 November 1962. Secret.
Source: CIA MDR Request
In its early years, NASA assistance to the intelligence community in analyzing the Soviet space program was on an ad hoc basis. In this memo, the DCI asks NASA’s deputy administrator to review the draft National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet space program that was published the following month. His comments are not known.
Document 7: NASA, Robert Seamans, Deputy Administrator, Letter to Dr. Albert Wheelon, Deputy Director (Science and Technology), Central Intelligence Agency, 27 May 1966. Secret.
Source: NASA History Office
This memo reviews the detail of two NASA engineers from the Office of Manned Space Flight to FMSAC beginning in 1964. Their duties included helping analyze the Soviet human spaceflight program and providing relevant information from NASA to the CIA. This arrangement continued into the late 1960s and perhaps beyond, but there is no information on exactly what the NASA personnel did.
Document 8: NASA/CIA, “Guidelines Governing the Serving of Officials of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as Consultants on Advisory Panels of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),” July 1965. Secret.
Source: CREST
To expand the NASA’s contributions to intelligence analysis, this agreement established the procedures under which NASA officials would serve on eight CIA advisory panels focusing on different aspects of aeronautical and space activities. The panels would meet twice a year for one or two days. The agreement expressly directed that the CIA would prepare all records of the panels and that the NASA input “will be purely consultative and advisory in nature.”
Document 9: CIA, “Notes on First Meeting of Lunar and Planetary Panel,” 20 June 1966. Secret.
This heavily redacted document contains the agenda and very summary minutes of the first meeting of the Lunar and Planetary Panel established under the above agreement. Very few records of the panel have been located and it is not known how long it remained in existence.
Document 10: USIB, Minutes of Meeting, Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee, 12 July 1983. Secret.
Source: CREST
NASA gained membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board’s Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) in the early 1970s. This heavily redacted document confirms that it continued its membership on the successor Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee as of 1983. These two committees were the highest-level interagency groups that examined foreign space and missile systems and evaluated the U.S. effort against these targets. Although some records of the GMAIC from the 1960s have been released, virtually all the post-1970 records of the two committees remain classified.
Document 11: CIA, Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, “Formation of a Space Intelligence Panel,” 13 September 1965. Secret. With attached Memorandum, “Space Intelligence Panel.” Secret.
Source: CREST
This memo sets forth the proposed duties and membership of the Space Intelligence Panel, which advised the DCI. Established in late 1965, all of its members were from outside the CIA, including two from NASA. The latter both left NASA before their four-year terms expired, and it is not known whether any other NASA personnel sat on the panel.
Document 12: CIA, “Space Panel Meeting, 19 November 1968,” 23 October 1968. Classification Unknown.
Source: CREST
This agenda is one of the few declassified records of the Space Intelligence Panel. The new large Soviet booster was the N-1 rocket designed to take cosmonauts to the Moon in competition with Apollo and the circumlunar program concerned the ongoing Soviet effort to be the first to place humans in the vicinity of the Moon.
Document 13: CIA, Richard Helms, Director, Letter to Clark M. Clifford, Secretary of Defense, 24 June 1968. Secret.
Source: CREST
In 1963, the CIA requested that a small group of engineers at NASA’s Langley Research Center help analyze the aeronautical properties of Soviet aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft. They built and tested models of Soviet vehicles in Langley’s wind tunnels, ran computer simulations on them, and prepared reports and briefings on the results. This memo summarizes a 1968 presentation by several engineers to the DCI. They gave numerous presentations to the defense and intelligence agencies before the project ended in the 1980s.
Document 14: CIA, [Redacted], Memorandum, “Cover Meeting with AWS and NACA,” to Project Security Officer, 20 March 1956, Secret.
Source: CREST
This memo summarizes a March 1956 meeting between the CIA, Air Weather Service, and Hugh Dryden, then director of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), on the cover story that the U-2 was a weather reconnaissance plane. NASA continued its participation in the cover story when it took over NACA, but ended up being greatly embarrassed by it in the aftermath of the shoot-down of Gary Powers’ plane in May 1960.
Document 15: CIA, James A. Cunningham, Jr., Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting with Dr. Hugh S. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, NASA, 11 June,” 12 June 1962. Secret.
Source: CREST
NASA continued its involvement in cover stories after the shoot-down of Gary Powers, but did not take a public role as it had with the U-2. This memo summarizes a 1962 CIA meeting with Dryden, now deputy administrator of NASA, on the cover story for and the technical progress of the A-12, the CIA’s planned successor to the U-2. In 1964, President Johnson announced the existence of the “A-11”, which was actually the Air Force’s YF-12A interceptor which had already been cancelled. The A-12 remained secret for many years.
Document 16: CIA, Memorandum for Dr. McMillan, et al., “Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee,” 21 August 1963. Confidential.
Source: CREST
To improve the development and dissemination of cover stories for overhead reconnaissance vehicles, the intelligence community established the Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee in 1963. Robert Seamans, then NASA’s associate administrator, was a consultant. Although the Committee was still in existence as of the early 1970s, none of its records has been released.
Document 17: Excerpt from Robert Perry’s A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIA – SAMOS, 1973. Top Secret/BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE.
Source: NRO Website
Beginning in 1961, NASA looked to the NRO for cameras that could collect the high-quality imagery needed to select Apollo landing sites on the Moon. It focused on the SAMOS E-1 film readout system, which had flown several times before all SAMOS film readout systems were cancelled at the end of 1961.
Document 18: DoD/CIA-NASA Agreement on NASA Reconnaissance Programs, 28 August 1963. Top Secret/BYEMAN. With cover letter from Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to James E. Webb, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 28 August 1963, Top Secret/BYEMAN.
Source: NRO MDR Request
The secretary of defense and NASA’s administrator signed this agreement establishing the procedures under which it could acquire National Reconnaissance Program cameras to image the Moon. It was signed just days before NASA issued the Requests for Proposal for the new Lunar Orbiter spacecraft. In 1964, NASA awarded the contract to Boeing whose spacecraft included the E-1 camera.
Document 19: Security Annex to DoD/CIA-NASA Agreement on NASA Reconnaissance Programs , dated 28 August 1963, Top Secret/BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE.
Source: NRO MDR Request
Shortly after the above agreement (Document 18) was signed, the NRO’s director and NASA’s associate administrator signed this agreement listing the classification level of about 40 types of information related to it.
Document 20: Supplemental Agreement on NASA Reconnaissance Programs, n.d. Top Secret/BYEMAN.
Source: NRO MDR Request
Growing concerns of the national security agencies that NASA could not protect security under the separate “white” and “black” contract procedures of the August 1963 agreement led to this modification in 1964 signed by the NRO’s director and NASA’s associate administrator. It provided that the NASA would obtain the hardware as classified Government Furnished Equipment from the NRO.
Document 21: DoD/NASA Agreement on the NASA Manned Lunar Mapping and Survey Program, 20 April 1964. Unclassified.
Source: NRO MDR Request
In the event that the Lunar Orbiters did not produce the needed imagery to select Apollo landing sites, NASA wanted to fly National Reconnaissance Program cameras in a manned lunar orbital mission to acquire it. The NRO’s director and NASA’s associate administrator signed this agreement to establish the necessary procedures. Its codeword annexes remain classified. The unclassified project name was Lunar Mapping and Survey System and the classified name was UPWARD.
Document 22: NRO, Alexander H. Flax to Mr. Nitze, et al., “NASA Lunar Mapping and Survey System (LM&SS),” 22 August 1967. Top Secret/BYEMAN.
Source: NRO MDR Request
Five Lunar Orbiters with the E-1 camera flew during 1966-1967 and collected the photographs required to select Apollo landing sites. In this memo, the NRO director informs the deputy secretary of defense, DCI, and president’s science advisor that NASA has cancelled the Lunar Mapping and Survey System.
Document 23: NRO, Frederick Hoffman, Lt. Col., USAF, to Dr. Naka, NRO Deputy Director, 28 January 1972. Secret/BYEMAN.
Source: NRO Staff Records
This memo to the NRO’s deputy director informs him that Apollo 15 carried a modified Itek IRIS II camera to image the Moon. Although not set forth in the memo, the IRIS II was used in U-2s. Apollo 16 and 17 also flew this camera. These three Apollo missions also had a modified Fairchild Dual Image Stellar Index Camera for mapping flown on CORONA satellites from 1967-1972.
Document 24: NRO, Brockway McMillan, Director, to Dr. Robert Seamans, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 4 August 1965. Top Secret/BYEMAN.
Source: NRO MDR Request
This agreement limited the capabilities of NASA’s space-based image-forming sensors used to photograph the Earth equivalent to a resolution of 20 meters or less from low-Earth orbit. It also restricted NASA’s use of satellite pointing and stabilization systems to a certain threshold and required NASA to inform the NRO of all specified “reconnaissance-related activities.”
Document 25: CIA, W.F. Raborn, Director, to Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 18 December 1965. Secret.
Source: CREST
In August 1965, the NRO and NASA reviewed all the imagery from the Gemini V civilian and DoD experiments because of the potential threat it posed to the National Reconnaissance Program. The DCI then intervened in the matter and established an intelligence community review mechanism beginning with Gemini VI and VII photography. This process remained in place through the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975, but there is little information on what images were withheld.
Document 26: CIA, Donald H. Steinenger, Assistant Deputy Director for Science and Technology, to Director of Central Intelligence, 8 April 1973. Top Secret/codeword.
Source: CREST
Beginning with Apollo 6 in 1968, NASA also had to submit its proposed photographic experiments for approval before each mission. NASA obtained permission in 1971 from the 40 Committee to use the Earth Terrain Camera in Skylab that exceeded the 20-meter resolution limit in the August 1965 NASA-NRO agreement on the condition that the photographic plans were examined beforehand and that the imagery was reviewed before public release. This memo sets forth the restrictions on the experiment and the release of the imagery, both of which the 40 Committee later approved.
Document 27: NSAM 156 Committee, Report, “Political and Security Aspects of Non-Military Applications of Satellite Earth-Sensing” 11 July 1966. Top Secret/BYEMAN. With attached Cover Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State, 11 July 1966, and letter from Charles L. Schultze to Dean Rusk, 4 April 1966.
Source: NASA MDR Request
NASA planned to fly image-forming sensors in the crewed Apollo Applications Program Earth-orbital missions that greatly exceeded the 20-meter resolution limit. In response to a request by the secretary of state, the interagency National Security Action Memorandum 156 Committee examined the issue of NASA’s space-based remote sensing program and issued this report. It endorsed a carefully planned program because of many political and scientific benefits and the technical restrictions in the August 1965 NASA-NRO agreement. However, the latter could probably be relaxed in the future as the state of the art advanced and as long as no international reaction resulted.
Document 28: “DoD-NASA Coordination of the Earth Resources Survey Program,” September 1966. Top Secret/BYEMAN.
Source: NASA MDR Request
This agreement, signed by the director of defense research & engineering and NASA’s deputy administrator, established procedures for the review of all NASA space-based remote sensing activities to eliminate any threats to the National Reconnaissance Program. It created the new working-level NASA-DoD Survey Applications Coordinating Committee, which was to report to the existing NASA-DoD Manned Space Flight Policy Committee.
Document 29: NRO, Memorandum, “Summary of Major SACC Coordination Activities, 9 May 1968 to 12 May 1969,” 21 May 1969. Top Secret/BYEMAN.
Source: NRO MDR Request
With the very broad definition of remote-sensing activities set forth in the above agreement (Document 28), the Survey Applications Coordination Committee in particular was very active. As this document describes, it did everything from reviewing papers planned for a United Nations conference to approving plans for the Landsat satellite to examining the technologies of astronomical satellites.
Document 30: Presidential Directive/NSC-37, “National Space Policy,” 11 May 1978. Top Secret.
Source: Jimmy Carter Presidential Library
This directive lowered the resolution limit of image-forming sensors NASA could use in space to 10 meters on a case-by-case basis. Although the exact reasons are unknown for this action, it was probably because there had been no significant international reaction to any of NASA’s Earth-imaging programs and NASA’s plans to carry some cameras on the Shuttle capable of achieving this new resolution.
Document 31: DDR&E, Ross M. Williams, Military Assistant, Strategic and Space Systems, Memorandum for the Director, Joint Staff, “SEASAT-A Synthetic Aperture Radar,”15 December 1977. Secret.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense MDR Request
Although the national security agencies had approved the use of the Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) on NASA’s SEASAT-A satellite scheduled for launch in 1978, they were concerned about it imaging military bases in the United States or other nations sending it unauthorized commands to acquire imagery for their use. NASA successfully resisted their demands to encrypt the uplinks and downlinks, but as set forth in this memo it agreed to install a device to prevent unauthorized commands, give the DoD advance notice of imaging plans, and not routinely image the United States.
Document 32: NASA/CIA/DoD, Memorandum of Agreement for the Conduct of Intelligence and Civil Space Programs, 1 August 1975. Secret/TALENT-KEYHOLE.
Source: Editor’s Collection (from Jeffrey Richelson)
Because NASA was increasingly using more sophisticated sensors in its space programs and the two committees under the September 1966 DoD-NASA agreement had stopped meeting, NASA’s administrator, the DCI, and the secretary of defense executed this agreement. It established the Program Review Board and two committees under it to protect sensitive technologies, coordinate civilian and military data release policies, and increase the sharing of technologies and data.
Document 33: Program Review Board, Meeting Summary , Data and Information Release Committee, 10 August 1977. Top Secret/BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE.
Source: NRO MDR Request
Few records of the Program Review Board and its two committees have been released. However, this Data and Information Release Committee meeting summary describes its involvement in many areas, such as reviewing the experiments planned for the second Shuttle flight and for Spacelab.
Document 34: J. M. Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Memorandum to James Beggs, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 21 February 1984. Secret.
Source: CREST
The pre- and post-mission review processes for NASA’s human spaceflight photography programs were not routinely used in the Shuttle program. However, due to national security concerns about the public release of photographs of some Soviet facilities taken by Shuttle astronauts in December 1983, the White House asked NASA to work with the defense and intelligence agencies to review future imagery. Although no documents on point have been released, the press reported that the photography from the next three Shuttle flights was examined before public release.
Document 35: DoD, Harold Brown to Dr. Jerome Weisner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, 23 December 1961. Confidential.
Source: Record Group 330, National Archives, College Park, Maryland
The DoD’s insistence on classifying most of the data from the NASA-DoD ANNA geodetic satellites resulted in NASA initially refusing to participate in the program. After pressure from NASA and numerous civilian scientists, the DoD agreed to treat most of the data as unclassified and NASA began participating. Only the second and last ANNA satellite, launched in 1962, reached orbit.
Document 36: Summary Minutes of the 36th Meeting of the Unmanned Spacecraft Panel of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, 14 April 1964. For Official Use Only.
Source: Record Group 330, National Archives, College Park, Maryland
This document describes the joint DoD-NASA National Geodetic Satellite Program (NGSP) established in 1964, which successfully launched five satellites in the next four years. The Navy requirements for certain orbits were established to collect the best data for improving the accuracy of its SLBMs.
Document 37: DoD, Paul Nitze [Deputy Secretary of Defense], Memorandum to the President, 5 November 1968. Secret.
Source: LBJ Presidential Library
The DoD refused to share with NASA most of the raw geodetic data from its own satellites and it classified processed data more accurate than could be derived solely from the NGSP. Nitze describes to the president the continuing conflict between NASA and the DoD about these policies and suggests some measures be taken to address it, but there is no evidence that any follow-up action was taken.
Document 38: DoD, William P. Clements, Jr. [Deputy Secretary of Defense], Letter to Honorable James C. Fletcher, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 3 April 1975. Secret. With attached: Malcolm R. Currie, Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, “NASA SEASAT and GEOS-C Space Experiments — Action Memorandum,” 2 April 1975; and Malcolm R. Currie, Memorandum for Under Secretary of the Air Force, “SEASAT,” 2 April 1975.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense MDR Request
Shortly before the 1975 launch of NASA GEOS-3 satellite which carried a radar altimeter to acquire geodetic data over the oceans to meet civilian and military requirements, the DoD requested that NASA encrypt the data, limit the collection over certain ocean areas because of its importance to the Soviets in improving the accuracy of its SLBMs, or delay the launch. As set forth in this memo, NASA rejected these demands but did enter into an agreement with the DoD to restrict the release of data from the ocean areas where Soviet SLBM submarines operated.
Document 39: DoD, Malcolm R. Currie [Director of Defense Research and Engineering], Letter to Honorable A.M. Lovelace, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 27 December 1976. Secret.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense MDR Request
The DoD continued insisting on encrypting the data from the even more capable radar altimeter planned for SEASAT-A, but NASA adamantly refused. NASA proposed that the orbit be changed to make the data less useful to the Navy (and the Soviets), but the Navy rejected this on the basis that the data acquired from the original orbit was best for improving the accuracy of its SLBMs.
Document 40: NSC, Michael Hornblow, Acting Staff Secretary, National Security Council, Memorandum to the Vice President, et al., “PRM/NSC-23, Coherent National Space Policy Critical Issues–SEASAT-A, Altimeter Data Collection Classification,” 2 May 1977. Confidential.
Source: Jimmy Carter Presidential Library
The fight over the SEASAT-A radar altimeter got elevated to the White House. With the new DoD civilian leadership now taking the position that the data from it (and the less accurate data from GEOS-3) would not be helpful to the Soviets, President Carter ordered that the data from the two satellites be freely distributed.
Document 41: NRO, Keith S. Peyton, Captain, USAF, Memorandum to Dr. McLucas [NRO Director], “ERTS Photography,” 28 August 1972. Top Secret/codeword deleted.
Source: NRO Staff Records
Shortly after the launch of Landsat 1, the intelligence community evaluated the potential use of its imagery and concluded that there were no current requirements for it.
Document 42: CIA, “USSR – Current Status of the 1977 Grain Crop,” 8 July 1977. Secret.
Source: CREST
Once NASA launched Landsat 2 in 1975 and began extensively imaging foreign agricultural areas with it, the CIA started acquiring the photography as one source in estimating the Soviet wheat crop and other foreign agricultural production. This 1977 report is just one example of many that used imagery from Landsat 2 and its successors.
Document 43: DoD, John S. Foster, Jr. [Director of Defense Research and Engineering], Letter to Carl Duckett, Deputy Director, Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency, 9 August 1972. Top Secret/BYEMAN. With attached: Leslie C. Dirks, [CIA], Memorandum to Howard P. Barfield, “Potential Space Shuttle Applications,” 20 July 1972. Top Secret/BYEMAN.
Source: CREST
This report examines possible uses of the Shuttle in a wide range of national security missions – to serve as a launch vehicle with increased capacity over existing ELVs; to check out satellites before deployment, repair them in orbit, or bring them back to Earth; or to assemble large structures in orbit. The key factor for any use was to develop a reliable, economical system.
Document 44: DoD, Harold Brown [Secretary of Defense], Memorandum to the President, “Budget Decision on Space Shuttle,” 11 November 1977. Classification Unknown.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense MDR Request
Brown and other DoD civilian leaders in the Carter administration were strong supporters of the Shuttle. When the Office of Management and Budget proposed in 1977 that the program be scaled back, Brown wrote the president that both launch complexes and five orbiters were critical; otherwise the program should be cancelled.
Document 45: DoD, S.L. Zeiberg, Deputy Under Secretary, Strategic and Space Systems, Memorandum to Director of Space AFRDS, “Impact of the Orbiter Procurement Decision on the DoD Mission Model,” 28 December 1977. Unclassified.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense MDR Request
The DoD further examined the fifth orbiter issue and determined that a complete one was not crucial, but the ability to acquire it was. President Carter then directed that both launch sites and four orbiters be built, with an option to procure a fifth.
Document 46: DoD, Harold Brown [Secretary of Defense], Memorandum to the President, “Department of Defense Space Shuttle Transition Plan,” 26 June 1978. Secret.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense MDR Request
Although Presidential Directive/NSC-37 from May 1978 (Document 30) directed that all U.S. government civilian and military payloads be launched eventually on the Shuttle (and that national security missions receive priority), there was considerable resistance in the DoD to moving payloads to the unproven system. In response to White House concerns over the slow transition, Brown wrote the president that the transition at Kennedy would begin in 1981 and at Vandenberg in 1983; the Shuttle would be launching all DoD payloads by 1985; the ELV backup capability would end then; and completely new payloads requiring the additional capacity of the Shuttle would be deployed beginning that year.
Document 47: Excerpt from NRO interview of former director Hans Mark, n.d. Secret/BYEMAN.
Source: NRO Website
As set forth in this oral history interview, the Shuttle program continued to experience major technical and financial problems. As a result, the secretary of defense went to the president in 1980 and persuaded him to fund it with an additional $1 billion from the Air Force budget.
Document 48: Excerpt from the General Accounting Office’s “DoD Participation in the Space Transportation System: Status and Issues”, Chapter 2, “Delays in DOD’s STS Efforts,” 28 February 1981. Unclassified.
Source: Editor’s Collection
This report examined a number of issues concerning DoD participation in the Shuttle program. Among others, it described the DoD’s postponement of the transition of some satellites and the resulting costs, the need to acquire more ELVs, and NASA’s study of thrust augmentation measures to eliminate the 8,000 pound performance shortfall at Vandenberg.
Document 49: National Security Decision Directive Number 164, “National Security Launch Strategy,” 25 February 1985. Classification Unknown.
Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
In 1983, the DoD began attempting to get permission to build a limited number of new ELVs that could launch payloads the same size and weight the Shuttle was designed to carry. The primary concern continued to be the Shuttle’s performance shortfall at Vandenberg. NASA strongly opposed the effort and argued that the DoD was abandoning the Shuttle, but in 1985 President Reagan signed this directive approving the DoD’s acquisition of the ten new ELVs (ultimately designated Titan IVs) for use in 1988-1992.
Document 50: Excerpt from Testimony of Air Force Secretary Edward C. Aldridge, in “Air Force Space Launch Policy and Plans,” Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 6 October 1987. Unclassified.
Source: Editor’s Collection
Secretary of the Air Force Pete Aldridge described in this hearing the massive problems the Challenger accident caused for the DoD. Few ELVs were available and their production lines had been closed. Combined with the long delay in the Shuttle returning to flight, this resulted in a huge backlog of satellites that needed to be placed in orbit. NASA’s cancellation of performance-enhancing measures due to safety reasons increased the Shuttle’s performance shortfall at Vandenberg to 16,000 pounds and caused the Air Force to mothball the Shuttle launch complex there. Its cancellation of the Centaur upper stage because of safety reasons rendered the Shuttle incapable of placing several DoD satellites over 5,000 pounds into geosynchronous orbit from Kennedy.
Document 51: National Security Decision Directive Number 254, “United States Space Launch Strategy,” 27 December 1986. Confidential.
Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
The Challenger accident led President Reagan to direct that the U.S. government not rely solely on the Shuttle to launch payloads but also rebuild and use a fleet of ELVs. The DoD quickly began to procure more Titan IVs and two new medium-lift ELVs. After flying eight dedicated, classified missions from 1988-1992, it stopped using the Shuttle as a launch vehicle.
NOTES
[1] See, e.g., William E. Burrows, This New Ocean: Tthe Story of the First Space Age (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 188-216; and Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985), pp. 141-56, 169-76.
[2] NASA’s aeronautical research centers (formerly under the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics) continued to help build virtually all military aircraft and some of their weapons. Although much of this support was overt, there was virtually no criticism of it. See, e.g., Donald D. Baals and William R. Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1981); and Edwin P. Hartman, Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1970).
[3] See, e.g., Dwayne A. Day and Asif Siddiqi, “The Moon in the Crosshairs: CIA Intelligence on the Soviet Manned Lunar Programme, Part 1 – Launch Complex.” Spaceflight 45 (November 2003): 466-75; Dwayne A. Day and Asif Siddiqi, “The Moon in the Crosshairs: CIA Intelligence on the Soviet Manned Lunar Programme, Part 2 – The J Vehicle.” Spaceflight 46 (March 2004): 113-25; Jeffrey T. Richelson,The U.S. Intelligence Community, 5th ed.(Boulder: Westview Press, 2008); Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001).
[4] The comprehensive history of UPWARD to date is Vance Mitchell’s “Showing the Way: NASA, the NRO and the Apollo Lunar Reconnaissance Program, 1963-1967,” Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly, 17, no. 4 (2010): 38-45.
[5] See, e.g., T.A. Heppenheimer, The Space Shuttle Decision, NASA’s Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1999), pp. 396-415; T.A. Heppenheimer, Development of the Shuttle, 1972-1981 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001); L. Parker Temple III, Shades of Gray, National Security and the Evolution of Space Reconnaissance (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004); Dwayne A. Day, “Invitation to Struggle: the History of Civilian Military Relations in Space”, John Logsdon, ed., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1996), pp. 223-71; Peter Hays, “NASA and the Department of Defense: Enduring Themes in Three Key Areas;” Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, eds. (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2006), pp. 199-238.
Listen to “NASA’s Secret Relationships with U.S. Defense and Intelligence Agencies – Documents and Evidence” on Spreaker.
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